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Abstract
We analyze an interaction between a ￿rm￿ s choice of organizational struc-
ture and competition in the product-market. Two organizational structures
are considered, namely a centralized-organization, whereby formal authority
is retained by a principal, and a decentralized-organization, whereby formal
authority is delegated to an agent. We show that the choice of organizational
structure hinges on a trade-o⁄ between operating-pro￿t and managerial ef-
fort. The principal may prefer to choose an organizational structure that
generates lower operating-pro￿t to motivate the agent to work hard. The
choice of organizational structure may also determine whether the rival is
active in the market or forced to exit the market.
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11 Introduction
Ronald Coase￿ s seminal publication (Coase, 1937) provided an impetus to the bur-
geoning literature on the theory of the ￿rm. In this literature, ￿rms are no longer
seen as merely a production function that transforms inputs into outputs, but in-
stead as a complex organization that consists of self-centered agents who coordinate
their activities in a hierarchy-of-command with a principal (CEO) acting as an ul-
timate decision-maker. Obviously, the principal faces some inevitable constraints
such as limited span of control, attention, and ability, and thus may wish to delegate
the decision-making authority to her subordinates to relax these constraints.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) develop a theoretical model that deals with this dele-
gation of authority within a ￿rm. In their paper, the principal has formal authority
in the ￿rm that gives her the right to make a decision which in turn a⁄ects the
￿rm￿ s payo⁄.1 Obviously, she will only be able to make a decision if she is informed
about all available choice of actions and their payo⁄ consequences. In addition,
having formal authority also enables her to overrule any decision proposed by her
subordinate that is not in line with her interests. Nevertheless, she may decide
not to overrule the agent￿ s decision when she is uninformed, and prefer to delegate
the decision making authority to the agent instead, thereby empowering the lat-
ter. Thus, even though the principal has formal authority, it is the agent who has
real authority in the ￿rm due to his information superiority. The formal authority
itself may also be delegated to the agent. Such a delegation of formal authority
empowers the agent to make a decision that cannot be overruled by the principal.
The optimality of the delegation of authority depends on a trade-o⁄ between loss
of control and managerial initiative. Delegation is thus like a double-edged sword:
It induces the agent to work harder, but it may result in a suboptimal decision by
the agent.
In this paper we further extend the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997) to ex-
plicitly capture an interplay between the delegation of decision-making authority
in a ￿rm and the product-market competition between the ￿rm and its rival. The
￿rm must take into account of its rival￿ s optimal competitive-strategy when choos-
ing its optimal competitive-strategy, and in turn this sort of strategy in￿ uences
the ￿rm￿ s choice of organizational structure, i.e. whether or not to delegate the
1Throughout the paper we use ￿ her￿for the principal and ￿ him￿for the agent.
2decision-making authority to an agent. Thus, a ￿rm￿ s organizational structure is
developed in response to its competitive strategy.2
The following examples further illustrate the important link between organi-
zational structure and business strategy.3 Prior to 1980, Eastment Kodak was
virtually a monopolist in ￿lm production. However, during the early 1980s, Ko-
dak￿ s market share was diminishing rapidly due to intense competition from its
rival Fuji Corporation which produces a higher quality ￿lm than Kodak. As a re-
sponse to this competitive pressure, Kodak decided to reorganize its structure of the
decision-making authority. It shifted to a more decentralized structure that allows
managers to make important decisions without approval from its CEO. Another
example is the case of Honda Motor Company in 1991. Prior to 1991, the company
adopted a decentralized decision making structure, in which important decision-
making authority was delegated by the CEO to managers. However, by late 1980s,
the company￿ s market share dropped to fourth position after Mitsubishi, Nissan and
Toyota. In 1991, the new CEO of Honda, Nobuhiro Kawamoto, decided to central-
ize decision-making within the company. These two examples clearly demonstrate
that competitive pressure can lead to either a more centralized or decentralized
decision-making structure.
In our model, the action chosen by either the principal or the agent when formal
authority is delegated in￿ uences the ￿rm￿ s relative competitive-position vis-￿-vis its
rival, and hence the ￿rm￿ s operating pro￿t. Accordingly, under some settings, the
principal may want to be the one choosing the decision, while under some other
conditions she may want to delegate the choice to the agent instead. Our approach
in modeling the principal￿ s decision and the corresponding trade-o⁄ follows that
of Marin and Verdier (2003). However, their paper aims at explaining the link
between ￿rm structure, and international trade and globalization. For that purpose,
they adopt a general-equilibrium macro framework. In contrast, our model aims
at capturing the details of product-market competition and their role in shaping
organizational structure, for which a partial-equilibrium Industrial Organization
(IO) framework is more appropriate.4
2This is an in￿ uential idea that was put forward decades ago by Alfred Chandler in his seminal
book (Chandler, 1962) that examines the historical evolution of the organizational structure of
big US corporations like Du Pont, Standard Oil and General Motors. Chandler (1962) concludes
that organizational structure is adapted to suit business strategy.
3The following two examples are taken from Brickley, J., C. Smith, and J. Zimmerman (2006).
4Another paper that uses the Aghion-Tirole framework to analyze the international trade and
3The following hypothetical scenario depicts the setting of our model. Con-
sider a ￿rm with a principal and an agent. Suppose that the ￿rm has to choose a
production-process to employ from the various production processes available. A
priori, both the principal and the agent do not really know the marginal-cost im-
plications of these various production processes. They need to exert costly e⁄ort to
enable them to learn these marginal-cost implications with some probability. As-
sume that there are exactly two production processes giving non-negative pro￿ts
to both the principal and the agent that are worth pursuing, and one of them is
preferred by the principal while the other one is preferred by the agent. When the
principal￿ s preferred production-process is implemented, the agent gets no private
bene￿ts. The agent gets some private bene￿ts only when his preferred production-
process is implemented.
The principal￿ s most preferred production-process entails lower marginal cost
than that of the agent. When the agent has a delegated authority (real or formal
authority) and is entitled to choose a production-process, he will choose the one
that generates private bene￿ts for him. Accordingly, from the principal￿ s view-
point, delegation of authority entails a trade-o⁄ between motivating the agent to
exert e⁄ort using private bene￿ts and employing an ine¢ cient production-process.
The principal￿ s payo⁄is not only determined by the choice of production-process
but also by the extent of product-market competition between the ￿rm and its com-
petitor. Thus, in contrast to the paper of Aghion and Tirole (1997) which considers
the principal￿ s payo⁄ as being exogenous, our paper considers it as being endoge-
nously determined. Suppose that a ￿rm engages in a Cournot duopoly competition
with its rival whose magnitude of marginal cost is in between that of the princi-
pal￿ s and the agent￿ s. When the agent receives a delegated-authority, he chooses
the less e¢ cient production-process than that of the rival and this puts the ￿rm
at a disadvantageous position vis-￿-vis its rival. Consequently, the ￿rm￿ s market
share shrinks. However, the delegation of decision-right and the presence of private
bene￿ts stimulate the agent to exert greater e⁄ort to acquire information on the
marginal-cost parameters of all production processes. It will thus bene￿t the prin-
cipal because it can save the principal￿ s e⁄ort costs and also induces the agent to
exert greater e⁄ort. Accordingly, the optimality of delegation crucially depends on
the marginal cost di⁄erence, product market competition, and managerial e⁄ort.
globalization issues is Puga and Tre› er (2007).
4We show that the optimal choice of organizational structure essentially depends
on a trade-o⁄ between inducing the agent to exert high e⁄ort and the reduction
in operating pro￿t. When the product market competition intensi￿es because the
￿rm￿ s marginal cost increases, or the rival￿ s marginal cost decreases, or the products
become more substitutable, the principal becomes less inclined to delegate formal
authority to the agent. Under some conditions, the principal may prefer to choose
an organizational structure that gives lower operating-pro￿t in order to motivate
the agent to work hard. We also show that the choice of organizational structure
may shape the prevailing market structure, in the sense that it determines whether
the rival is active in the market or forced to exit.
Our paper is related to the IO literature on the strategic delegation and prod-
uct market competition pioneered by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987)
and Sklivas (1987). This literature focuses on the role of incentive-compensation
contracts that owners of competing ￿rms give to their managers and, on how these
incentive-compensation contracts can a⁄ect the outcome of product market com-
petition. Owners delegate the output decision to their managers, and in exchange
managers receive a monetary compensation that is tied to the ￿rms￿pro￿ts and
sales. It is shown that by giving more emphasis on sales rather than on pro￿ts,
a principal can induce her manager to act more aggressively by choosing a higher
level of output.5 Our paper, although is done in an entirely di⁄erent modeling
framework, also deals with delegation by a principal to an agent. The principal
may delegate not only the output decision but also the choice of production process
to be implemented in the ￿rm to the agent. In exchange, the managers may be
allowed to choose a production process that gives him private bene￿ts. Thus, we
focus on non-monetary compensation instead of monetary compensation.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
while Section 3 presents the solutions. Section 4 discusses several market structure
con￿gurations arising from these solutions. Section 5 summarizes the results and
concludes.
5Subsequently, there have been extensive research that extends further this particular literature
into various directions. The most recent one is Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2007).
6To ensure participation, it is assumed that the agent in our paper receives his reservation
wage which is normalized to zero.
52 The Model
There are essentially two building blocks of the model, the ￿rst one is the choice of
organizational structure and the second one is the product market competition.
2.1 Organizational Structure
This building block is largely based on Aghion and Tirole (1997). There are two
￿rms, called 1 and 2. Firm 1 consists of a principal (P) and an agent (A). The prin-
cipal must decide which organizational structure of the decision-making authority
to adopt in the ￿rm. There are two organizational structures available, namely a
centralized decision-making authority (P-organization) in which the principal re-
tains the formal decision-right (formal authority) in the ￿rm, and a decentralized
decision-making authority (A-organization) in which the principal delegates formal
authority to the agent. Throughout this paper, we only focus on ￿rm 1￿ s choice of
organizational structure. We assume that ￿rm 2 is owned and self-managed by its
principal.7
Firm 1 must choose a production-process to employ out of N available options.
The marginal cost implications of all available production-processes are initially
unknown, but they can be inferred by exerting e⁄ort. The principal￿ s e⁄ort is
denoted by E and the agent￿ s e⁄ort is denoted by e. Exerting e⁄ort is costly for
both. The cost of e⁄ort is quadratic and takes the form of E2=2 and e2=2 for
respectively the principal and the agent. Upon exerting e⁄ort they will be informed
about the marginal cost parameters with probabilities E and e.
The principal has her most preferred production-process which, when imple-
mented, gives marginal cost cp, with p indicating the principal￿ s production process.
Likewise, the agent has his most preferred production-process which, when imple-
mented, gives marginal cost ca = ￿cp with ￿ ￿ 1 and a indicating the agent￿ s pro-
duction process. The rival (i.e. ￿rm 2) is assumed to employ a production-process
that gives marginal cost c. Essentially, the setting we are describing here is an ex-
ample of the well-known managerial moral-hazard problem. When the manager has
some discretion in choosing the production technology, he may not always select the
7This set-up allows us to isolate the impact of competitive pressure from the ￿ strategic￿impact
of the rival￿ s (￿rm 2￿ s) choice of organizational structure on ￿rm 1￿ s choice of organizational
structure. Thus, it enables us to have a cleaner analysis on the interplay between competitive
pressure and organizational structure and also simpli￿es our analysis considerably.
6most e¢ cient production-technology when choosing it forces him to forego substan-
tial private bene￿ts (see for instance Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Aghion and Tirole
1997, and Tirole 2006 for more detailed descriptions of managerial moral-hazard).
We rule out random-picking of production-process by assuming that at least one
of the available production-processes has in￿nitely large marginal cost. This also
implies that when none is informed, they will prefer to be inactive.
The party with formal authority, who could be either the agent or the principal,
has the ultimate right to choose a production-process to employ. Obviously, she (he)
will choose her (his) most preferred production-process when informed. The formal
authority may be retained by the principal or delegated to the agent. When it is del-
egated, the agent has the power to choose a production-process to employ without
being overruled by the principal. When the formal authority holder is uninformed,
she (he) is willing to implement the other party￿ s most preferred production-process.
Thus, in such a case this other party e⁄ectively has the real-authority in the ￿rm.
Throughout the paper we thus distinguish authority into formal and real authority.
The later is the ￿ de-jure￿ authority which is formally and/ or legally assigned to
its holder, while the later is the ￿ de-facto￿authority which is obtained through a
possession of superior information.
Similar to Aghion and Tirole (1997) we assume that the agent is solely motivated
by private bene￿ts. His most preferred production-process brings private bene￿ts
b, however it may not necessarily be the most economical one for the principal
as ca ￿ cp. On the contrary, the principal￿ s most preferred production-process is
potentially more e¢ cient than that of the agent, but when it is employed the agent
receives no private bene￿ts.8 Consequently, it reduces the agent￿ s incentive to exert
e⁄ort.9
The principal receives the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t ￿1i, with i 2 fp;ag denotes the chosen
production-process, which could either be the one that is most preferred by the
principal (p) or the one that is most preferred by the agent (a). The magnitude of
￿1i depends on the relative marginal cost of the ￿rm vis-￿-vis its rival and also on
the nature of product-market competition. Thus, in our framework the payo⁄ of
8We can also easily consider a less extreme case in which the agent receives some positive private
bene￿ts instead of no private bene￿ts when the principal￿ s most preferred production-process is
implemented. Such a consideration should not a⁄ect the qualitative aspects of our results.
9Our approach in modelling the trade-o⁄ faced by the principal is adapted from Marin and
Verdier (2003).
7the principal is going to be endogenously determined. When the principal￿ s most
preferred production-process is implemented, she obtains ￿1p, however when the
agent￿ s most preferred production-process is implemented instead, she obtains only
￿1a. Given that cp ￿ ca = ￿cp, we therefore have ￿1p ￿ ￿1a, and we can express the
relationship between the two pro￿ts as, ￿1a = ￿￿1p with ￿ 2 [0;1]. We interpret
￿ as the degree of interest-congruence between the principal and the agent. When
￿ = 1; their interests are perfectly aligned, and accordingly the principal receives
the same amount of pro￿t no matter which production-process is implemented. For





This endogenous determination of the interest-congruence parameter represents an-
other important departure from the Aghion-Tirole￿ s framework.
2.2 Product Market Competition
Firms 1 and 2 produce di⁄erentiated goods. The demand side is characterized by
the following quadratic representative consumer￿ s utility function,











where i 2 fp;ag denotes the chosen production-process, ￿ 2 [0;1] is a parameter
measuring the degree (strength) of product di⁄erentiation, q1i and q2i are the goods
produced by respectively ￿rms 1 and 2, and z is a numeraire good. The two prod-
ucts are independent, i.e. completely di⁄erentiated, when the degree of product
substitution equals to zero (￿ = 0), and they are homogenous when ￿ equals to one.
This utility function is a variant of the one used in Singh and Vives (1984) and
Zanchettin (2006).
From the utility maximization problem, we obtain the following linear-demand
functions,
q1i = ￿0 ￿ ￿1p1i ￿ ￿2p2i (2)
q2i = ￿0 ￿ ￿1p2i ￿ ￿2p1i; (3)
where ￿0 = 1
1+￿, ￿1 = 1
1￿￿2, and ￿2 =
￿
1￿￿2. Assuming that ￿ < 1, these linear
demand functions can be inverted to yield,
8P1i = 1 ￿ q1i ￿ ￿q2i (4)
P2i = 1 ￿ q2i ￿ ￿q1i (5)
Firms 1 and 2 engage in Cournot duopoly-competition.10
2.3 The Time Line
The time-line of the model is summarized in Figure 1 below. At t = 0, the prin-
cipal chooses either a centralized decision-making structure (P-organization) or a
decentralized decision-making structure (A-organization). In P-organization, the
principal has formal authority over the choice of production-process, while in A-
organization, the principal delegates formal authority to the agent. At t = 1, both
the principal and the agent simultaneously exert costly e⁄ort to obtain information
on the marginal-cost parameters of the production processes. When informed, the
holder of formal authority chooses a production-process, otherwise, when she (he) is
uninformed, the other informed party will choose a production-process. When both
are uninformed, no production-process is chosen and the ￿rm is inactive. At t = 2,
the ￿rm begins its production using the chosen production-process and competes
with its rival in a Cournot fashion. Finally, at t = 3, all payo⁄s are realized. We
solve the model using backward induction.
3 Solution of the Model
We begin with the product-market competition. At this stage, we take as given the
optimal organizational-structure chosen in an earlier stage.
3.1 Product-Market Competition
The ￿rms￿pro￿t functions can be expressed as,
￿1i = (1 ￿ q1i ￿ ￿q2i)q1i ￿ ciq1i (6)
￿2i = (1 ￿ q2i ￿ ￿q1i)q2i ￿ cq2i; (7)
10The results obtained under Bertrand competition are qualitatively the same as those obtained
under Cournot competition and are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 1: The Time Line of the Model
with i 2 fp;ag. Recall that ca = ￿cp with ￿ ￿ 1. Both ￿rms will be active in the
market when their optimal quantities are positive. Whether or not a ￿rm￿ s optimal
quantity is positive depends on the magnitude of the degree of product substitution
(￿) and the marginal-cost of the two competing ￿rms (c and ci).
Under duopoly, given that the production-process i is chosen, the optimal quan-










2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 2c + ci
(4 ￿ ￿2)
: (9)
Superscript C denotes the Cournot case, and subscript d denotes the duopoly case.
Firms 1 and 2 will be active and produce positive quantities if and only if,
[2c ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)] < ci <
1
2
[c + (2 ￿ ￿)]: (10)
When ci > 1
2 [c + (2 ￿ ￿)] prevails, it implies that the marginal cost of ￿rm 1 result-
ing from production-process i is so high that it is not possible for ￿rm 1 to be active
in the market. Consequently, ￿rm 2 will be a monopolist. On the other hand, when
ci < [2c ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)] prevails, it implies that the marginal cost of ￿rm 1 resulting from
10production-process i is su¢ ciently lower than its rival. Firm 2 cannot pro￿tably
compete with ￿rm 1, and thus the latter will be a monopolist. Since the focus of our
analysis is on ￿rm 1￿ s choice of organizational structure, we only consider cases in
which ￿rm 1 is active in the market no matter which production-process i 2 fp;ag
it chooses. We therefore impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 For all i 2 fp;ag, ci < 1
2 [c + (2 ￿ ￿)]:
This assumption implies that ￿rm 1￿ s marginal cost ci should not be too high relative
to its rival￿ s marginal cost c. Otherwise, ￿rm 1 can never be active in the market.






Subscript m denotes the monopoly case.
Assumption 2 0 ￿ c < 2 ￿ ￿ and for all i 2 fp;ag, 0 ￿ ci < 1.
The ￿rst part of the assumption ensures that [2c ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)] and 1
2 [c + (2 ￿ ￿)] in
(10) are, respectively, the lower and upper bounds of ci that give us the duopoly
case. The second part of the assumption implies that the case in which ￿rm 1 is a
monopolist is potentially viable. For notational simplicity we de￿ne,




[c + (2 ￿ ￿)]:
The prevailing market-structure depends on the relative magnitude of ci; i 2
fp;ag; vis-a-vis c. The following lemma describes the prevailing market-structure
con￿gurations.
Lemma 1 Given ￿rm 1￿ s choice of production-process i 2 fp;ag, its resulting mar-
ginal cost of either cp or ca = ￿cp (with ￿ ￿ 1), ￿rm 2￿ s marginal cost c, and also
Assumptions 1 and 2, we have the following market-structure con￿gurations;
11Thus, when the rival￿ s marginal cost is too high relative to ￿rm 1￿ s marginal cost, we have
(2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 2c + ci) < 0. Firm 2 will produce nothing (qC
2i;d = 0).
11(i) For ￿ < cp < ￿cp < ￿, ￿rms 1 and 2 are duopolists no matter which
production-process is chosen by ￿rm 1.
(ii) For cp < ￿ < ￿cp < ￿, ￿rm 1 is a monopolist when production-process p is
chosen by ￿rm 1, whilst ￿rms 1 and 2 are duopolists when production-process
a is chosen by ￿rm 1.
(iii) For cp < ￿cp < ￿ < ￿, ￿rm 1 is a monopolist no matter which production-
process is chosen by ￿rm 1.
It is interesting to note that as the degree of product substitution ￿ approaches
to one (zero), the range of cp that allows for duopoly competition becomes smaller
(larger). A higher ￿ (i.e. closer to 1) implies a tougher competition since both
products become less di⁄erentiated, consequently, a ￿rm that has lower marginal
cost will likely be a monopolist. The opposite prevails for a lower ￿.
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(4 ￿ ￿2)2 ; (13)






Using the above expressions for equilibrium pro￿ts, we can derive the following
congruence parameters ￿j, j 2 f1;2;3g denotes various market-structure con￿gu-
rations stated in Points (i), (ii), and (iii) of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 The degree of interest-congruence between the principal and the agent


















The congruence parameter ￿, to some extent, also captures the cost of delegation
for the principal. Delegation of formal or real authority reduces ￿rm￿ s pro￿t due
to the agent choosing an ine¢ cient production-process. Nevertheless, despite the
pro￿t reduction, the principal may still be willing to delegate authority in order to
12motivate the agent to work hard. To have ￿ 2 [0;1], we require that ￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿C
1p;d
in con￿guration 1 and ￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿1p;m in market-structure con￿guration 2. Since the
agent￿ s most preferred production-process is clearly less e¢ cient than the princi-
pal￿ s most preferred production process we obviously have ￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿C
1p;d. It is also
straightforward to verify that ￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿1p;m.12
Notice that when ￿ approaches one, ￿1 and ￿3 in Lemma 2 should also approach
one, implying that the interests of the principal and the agent become almost per-
fectly aligned. It is also obvious that ￿3 does not depend on the degree of product
di⁄erentiation ￿ because no matter which production-process is chosen, ￿rm 1 is
always a monopolist under this market-structure.
Subsequently, we evaluate the impact of an increase in, among others; the de-
gree of product-substitution ￿, the rival￿ s marginal cost c, ￿rm 1￿ s marginal cost
when the principal￿ s most preferred production-process is implemented cp, and the
cost-ine¢ ciency of the agent￿ s most preferred production process ￿ on congruence
parameters ￿1 and ￿2.13 We have the following result.
Proposition 1 The degree of interest-congruence between the principal and the
agent under all market-structure con￿gurations, ￿j, j 2 f1;2;3g, are a⁄ected by the
rival￿ s marginal cost c, ￿rm 1￿ s marginal cost when the principal￿ s most preferred
production-process is implemented cp, the cost-ine¢ ciency of the agent￿ s most pre-








@￿ < 0; and
@￿1
@￿ ￿ 0.
12The proof of ￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿1p;m can be sketched as follows. The f.o.c.s of (12),




















1 ￿ q1i;m ￿ q1i;m ￿ ci
￿
= 0: Next, we can express the monopoly and duopoly










. We know that if q1i;m ￿ qC
1i;d then ￿1i;m ￿
￿C









1 ￿ q1i;m ￿ ￿qC











2i;d, which is clearly non-
positive given that 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Hence, we can establish that q1i;m ￿ qC
1i;d, which implies that
￿1i;m ￿ ￿C
1i;d.
13Only the congruence parameters under market-structure con￿gurations 1 and 2, i.e. ￿1 and
￿2, are going to be a⁄ected by the degree of product substitution ￿. This is because duopoly




















@c can be explained as follows. An increase in
the rival￿ s marginal cost c, ceteris paribus, softens the product market competition
for ￿rm 1, and boosts its pro￿t. We also know that ￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿C
1p;d ￿ ￿1p;m, and thus
the positive impact of an increase in c will be larger when the pro￿t is smaller.
This implies that ￿C
1a;d will increase the most, followed by ￿C
1p;d and ￿1p;m when c
increases. Since ￿1 = ￿C
1a;d=￿C
1p;d and ￿2 = ￿C
1a;d=￿1p;m, both ￿1 and ￿2 will therefore
increase when c increases. All in all, the higher the cost advantage of ￿rm 1 vis-a-vis
￿rm 2 is, the higher the interest alignment between the principal and the agent will
be.




@cp is analogous to the
one above. An increase in ￿rm 10s marginal cost cp, ceteris paribus, toughens the
product market competition for ￿rm 1, and reduce its pro￿t regardless of whether
the ￿rm is a monopolist or a duopolist. Given that we have ￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿C
1p;d ￿ ￿1p;m,
the reduction in ￿C
1a;d will be the largest, followed by the reduction in ￿C
1p;d and
￿1p;m. Consequently, the higher is the cost disadvantage of ￿rm 1 vis-￿-vis ￿rm 2,
the lower the interest alignment between the principal and the agent will be.
The degree of product substitution ￿ only in￿ uences ￿1 and ￿2 but not ￿3. An
increase in ￿ toughens the product market competition for both ￿rms, and squeezes
their pro￿ts. The reduction in ￿C
1a;d dominates the reduction in ￿C
1p;d, and conse-
quently ￿1 falls. However, in market-structure con￿guration 2, only the numerator
of ￿2 is negatively a⁄ected by an increase in ￿. As a result, ￿2 falls, implying
that, when ￿ increases, it becomes increasingly more attractive for the principal to
implement her most preferred production process than that of the agent.
Finally, an increase in ￿ implies that the duopoly pro￿t ￿C
1a;d and the monopoly
pro￿t ￿1a;m decrease, while the duopoly pro￿t ￿C
1p;d and the monopoly pro￿t ￿1p;m
remain unchanged. Accordingly, it is straightforward to see that ￿1, ￿2, and ￿3 will
thus fall.
143.2 The Optimal Choice of Production Process and E⁄ort
Levels
Next, we move backward to the earlier stage. In P-organization, the principal re-
tains formal authority and chooses the production-process whenever she is informed.
If she is uninformed, she is willing to delegate the choice to an informed agent. The
principal and the agent￿ s expected payo⁄s can be expressed as,








The above expected payo⁄s are constructed in the following way. With proba-
bility Ee, the principal and the agent are both informed, and the principal overrules
the agent￿ s choice of production-process and ask the agent to implement the prin-
cipal￿ s most preferred production-process instead. The principal obtains ￿1p and
the agent obtains no private bene￿ts. The magnitude of pro￿ts ￿1p depends on the
market-structure con￿gurations derived previously. Recall that ￿rm 1 may become
either a monopolist and obtain ￿1p = ￿1p;m, or a duopolist and obtain ￿1p = ￿C
1p;d.
With probability E (1 ￿ e), only the principal is informed, and thus she would
prefer to implement her most preferred production-process that yields pro￿ts ￿1p
for the principal and no private bene￿ts for the agent.
With probability (1 ￿ E)e, only the agent is informed, and thus it is optimal
for the principal to let the agent implement his most preferred production-process.
Thus, here the agent has the real-authority. The principal obtains ￿￿1p, ￿ 2 [0;1],
while the agent obtains b. Recall that ￿ is endogenously determined and its value
depends on the prevailing market-structure con￿guration j 2 f1;2;3g that was
derived in the previous section.
Finally, with probability (1 ￿ E)(1 ￿ e), both the principal and the agent are
uninformed, status-quo prevails and payo⁄s are normalized to 0.
Exerting e⁄ort is costly for both the principal and the agent and the costs are
assumed to be increasing at an increasing rate in the amount of e⁄ort exerted, i.e.
E2=2 and e2=2.
The principal and the agent choose respectively E and e to maximize their
expected payo⁄s. The e⁄ort best-response functions can be derived as E￿ =
15(1 ￿ e￿)￿1p and e￿ = (1 ￿ E￿)b. We require 0 ￿ ￿1p ￿ 1 and 0 ￿ ￿b ￿ 1 for
stability and to ensure that the equilibrium e⁄ort levels are non-negative. We can
also observe that e⁄ort levels are strategic substitutes, E is decreasing in e; and















It can be straightforwardly veri￿ed that @E￿
@￿1p > 0, @E￿
@b < 0, and @E￿
@￿ < 0 for the
principal; and @e￿
@￿1p < 0, @e￿
@b > 0,and @e￿
@￿ > 0 for the agent. These are essentially
the results obtained by Aghion and Tirole (1997). Higher pro￿ts induce higher
monitoring-e⁄ort by the principal, and less e⁄ort by the agent. Higher private
bene￿ts motivate the agent to work harder and lower the monitoring-e⁄ort by the
principal. Finally, when the interests of the principal and the agent become more
aligned, the principal lowers her monitoring-e⁄ort and the agent exerts more e⁄ort.
In A-organization, the principal delegates the formal decision-right to the agent.
The agent will then choose the production-process whenever he is informed and
the principal cannot overrule the agent￿ s decision. However, when the agent is
uninformed while the principal is informed, the principal will instead choose the
production-process. Thus, in this case the principal has the real decision-right.
The principal and the agent￿ s expected payo⁄s (denoted by VA and VP) can be
written as,








The above expected payo⁄s are constructed in a similar fashion as the expected
payo⁄s under P-organization. The e⁄ort best-response functions can be derived
respectively as, E￿￿ = (1 ￿ e￿￿)￿1p and e￿￿ = b. We require that 0 ￿ ￿1p ￿ 1
and 0 ￿ b ￿ 1 for stability and to ensure that the equilibrium e⁄ort levels are
non-negative. The optimal e⁄ort levels under A-organization can be derived as,
16E
￿￿ = (1 ￿ b)￿1p (21)
e
￿￿ = b (22)
It can be easily veri￿ed that under A-organization we have @E￿￿
@￿1p > 0, @E￿￿
@b < 0,and
@E￿￿
@￿ = 0 for the principal; and @e￿￿
@￿1p = 0, @e￿￿
@b > 0,and @e￿￿
@￿ = 0 for the agent.
3.3 The Choice of Organizational Structure: P-organization
v.s. A-organization
We now evaluate the principal￿ s choice of organizational structure. We begin with
the principal￿ s expected payo⁄s under P-organization. By plugging back the solu-
tions for the optimal e⁄ort levels (17) and (18) into (15) we can express the prin-




, in which ￿1p is the optimal pro￿t derived
in the product-market competition stage. We can then show that,




























￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿1p=1
= 1.




















= 0 if ￿1p = 3￿b￿1
2￿b .
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, UP is increasing in ￿1p, and given that ￿1p 2 [0;1], the lower and upper
bounds of UP are equal to those stated in Point (i). Also, UP is concave in ￿1p for
￿1p < 3￿b￿1
2￿b and convex in ￿1p for ￿1p > 3￿b￿1
2￿b , and ￿1p = 3￿b￿1
2￿b is the in￿ ection
point of UP. It can be easily veri￿ed that there exists a non-negative in￿ ection point
only if 1=3 < ￿b ￿ 1. Consequently, when 0 ￿ ￿b ￿ 1=3 prevails, UP is convex in
￿1p.
17Next, we evaluate the principal￿ s expected payo⁄s under A-organization. By





, where ￿1p is the optimal pro￿t derived in the product-market
competition stage. We can then show that,
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Thus, VP is increasing and convex in ￿1p, and given that ￿1p 2 [0;1], the lower
and upper bounds of VP are equal to those stated in Point 1.









for all of the admissible range of ￿, b, and ￿1p to determine under
what conditions P-organization is superior to A-organization, and vice versa. The
result is stated in the following proposition.








, when 0 < ￿b < 1
3 and b < 2(1 ￿ ￿) are satis￿ed simultaneously.









when either 0 < ￿b < 1
3 and b > 2(1￿￿) are satis￿ed simultaneously, or 1
3 < ￿b < 1
is satis￿ed.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2 depicts the above proposition graphically. In x-axis, we have the
interest-congruence parameter ￿ and in y-axis we have private bene￿ts b. When
the degree of interest-congruence ￿ is su¢ ciently small, it is always better for the
principal to retain formal authority by adopting P-organization. However, when
the congruence parameter ￿ is su¢ ciently high, the attractiveness of A-organization
18is increasing in the level of private bene￿ts b. This is because when the principal
and the agent have su¢ ciently aligned interests and private bene￿ts b are su¢ -
ciently high, delegation of formal authority to the agent will motivate the agent to
exert higher e⁄ort. This will increase the probability of the agent being informed.
Accordingly, there is a higher chance that the agent￿ s most preferred production-
process is implemented. Since the congruence parameter ￿ is su¢ ciently high, the
















Figure 2: The Optimal Choice of Organizational Structure
Proposition 3 Under A-organization, the agent￿ s most preferred production-process
(a) is more likely to be chosen than the principal￿ s most preferred production-process
(p). The latter is more likely to be chosen under P-organization.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the next section we will evaluate what happen to the optimal choice of orga-
nizational structure when the intensity of product market competition changes.
194 Discussions
4.1 Market-Structure Con￿guration 1: The Duopoly Case
Under this con￿guration, the assignment of real authority does not really matter for
the market structure. No matter who has real authority, the selected production-
process will result in duopoly competition. However, the principal￿ s and the agent￿ s
expected payo⁄s will depend on who has formal authority in the ￿rm. The principal
will therefore choose an organizational structure that gives her the highest expected
payo⁄.
Figure 2 depicts the principal￿ s choice of organizational structure. A-organization
dominates P-organization for all pairs of (￿;b) located in the VP area, while P-
organization dominates A-organization for all pairs of (￿;b) located in the UP
area. Note that private bene￿ts b are exogenously determined, while the degree
of interest-congruence ￿1 depends on among others; the rival￿ s marginal cost c, the
￿rm￿ s marginal cost under the principal￿ s most preferred production-process cp, the
ine¢ ciency-parameter of the agent￿ s most preferred production-process ￿, and the
degree of product substitution ￿. The following proposition summarizes the impacts
of a change in exogenous variables (c; cp, ￿, ￿) a⁄ecting ￿1 and the level of private
bene￿ts b on the optimal choice of organizational-structure. As a benchmark, we
consider the case in which the principal is indi⁄erent between the two organizational
structures.
Proposition 4 Suppose that initially the principal is indi⁄erent between retaining
formal authority, i.e. choosing P-organization, and delegating formal authority, i.e.
choosing A-organization, and the relative marginal-costs con￿guration is given by
￿ < cp < ￿cp < ￿.
(i) Holding b constant, the principal delegates (retains) formal authority if any
of these changes prevails; c increases (decreases), cp decreases (increases), ￿
decreases (increases), or ￿ decreases (increases).
(ii) Holding ￿ constant, the principal delegates (retains) formal authority if the
agent￿ s private bene￿ts (b) increase (decrease).
Points (i) and (ii) above are derived using the results stated in Propositions
1 and 2. Choosing A-organization implies that the principal is willing to give up
20formal authority. This also implies that, when the agent is informed, the principal
will never be able to force the agent to implement her most preferred production-
process, which is more e¢ cient. Nonetheless, the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ un-
der A-organization may still be higher than that under P-organization. Under
A-organization, the agent will be more motivated to exert e⁄ort. Since e⁄ort levels
are strategic substitutes, an increase in the agent￿ s e⁄ort levels should decrease the
principal￿ s e⁄ort levels, thereby allowing the principal to gain from a reduction in
the cost of e⁄ort and an increase in the probability of implementing a production-
process other than the status quo. As long as the gains outweigh the reduction
in the ￿rm￿ s operating pro￿t (￿C
1a;d ￿ ￿C
1p;d) due to the adoption of a less e¢ cient
production-process, choosing A-organization is indeed optimal for the principal. All
in all, we have shown that the optimal choice of organizational structure crucially
depends on a trade-o⁄ between operating pro￿t and managerial e⁄ort.
It is also worth noting that our results point to a negative relationship between
the toughness of product-market competition and the incentive of the principal
to delegate formal authority. Competition becomes tougher for ￿rm 1 when its
marginal cost increases, or its rival￿ s marginal cost decreases, or the ine¢ ciency
parameter of the agent￿ s most preferred production-process increases. In such cases,
￿rm 2 becomes relatively more e¢ cient than ￿rm 1. Its pro￿t will increase at the
expense of ￿rm 1. Competition also becomes tougher when products are more
substitutable. However, it negatively a⁄ects both ￿rms in a similar fashion. We
show in this paper that a tougher competition makes the principal less inclined to
delegate formal-authority to the agent.
The case of delegation of formal authority (or A-organization) can also be loosely
interpreted as outsourcing or divestiture, while the case of no-delegation of formal
authority (or P-organization) can be loosely interpreted as merger or integration.
On the basis of this loose interpretation, our results argue that a more intense
competition should result in a higher prevalence of integrated ￿rms.
4.2 Market-Structure Con￿guration 2: The Mixed Case
Under this con￿guration, ￿rm 1 is a duopolist whenever the agent has real authority
and selects his most preferred production process, but instead ￿rm 1 is a monopolist
whenever the principal has real authority and selects her most preferred production
process. Similar to the previous market-structure con￿guration, the assignment
21of formal authority determines the magnitude of the agent￿ s and the principal￿ s
expected payo⁄s.
The following proposition summarizes the impacts of a change in the exogenous
variables (c; cp, ￿, ￿) a⁄ecting ￿2 and the level of private bene￿ts b on the optimal
choice of organizational-structure. The case in which the principal is indi⁄erent
between the two organizational structures is used as our benchmark.
Proposition 5 Suppose that initially the principal is indi⁄erent between retaining
formal authority, i.e. choosing P-organization, and delegating formal authority, i.e.
choosing A-organization, and the relative marginal-costs con￿guration is given by
cp < ￿ < ￿cp < ￿.
(i) Holding b constant, the principal delegates (retains) formal authority if any
of these changes prevails; c increases (decreases), cp decreases (increases), ￿
decreases (increases), or ￿ decreases.
(ii) Holding ￿ constant, the principal delegates (retains) formal authority if the
agent￿ s private bene￿ts (b) increase (decrease).
Thus, when ￿rm 1 faces less intense product-market competition, for instance
because of the rival￿ s marginal cost increases, or its own marginal cost decreases,
or the products become less substitutable, it is more likely that the principal will
choose A-organization than P-organization. Otherwise, when ￿rm 1 faces a tougher
competition, it is more likely that the principal will choose P-organization than A-
organization.
From proposition 3 we know that in A-organization, production-process a has
a higher probability of being chosen than production process p. We also know that
under this market-structure con￿guration, duopoly competition prevails when a is
being implemented, while monopoly prevails when p is being implemented instead.
Therefore, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In market-structure con￿guration 2, duopoly competition is more
likely to occur when A-organization is chosen, while monopoly is more likely when
P-organization is chosen instead.
22All in all, our results presented in this sub-section point to interesting implica-
tions. First, we show that when the product-market competition becomes softer
A-organization is more likely be chosen, and this implies that duopoly competition
is more likely to occur. We know that duopoly pro￿t is less than monopoly pro￿t,
and yet ￿rm 1 would rather choose A-organization than P-organization. Thus, ￿rm
1 would prefer to accommodate rather than to drive its rival out of the market. By
sacri￿cing operating pro￿t, the principal can motivate the agent to greater e⁄ort and
this allows the principal to economize on her e⁄ort cost. Since the product-market
competition is softening, the degree of interest congruence between the principal
and the agent increases, and therefore the reduction in operating pro￿t does not
dominate the bene￿t of e⁄ort-cost reduction.
Second, when the product-market competition becomes tougher, P-organization
is more likely be chosen, and this implies that monopoly is more likely to occur. By
choosing P-organization, ￿rm 1 is able to drive its rival out of the market. Here, the
reduction in operating pro￿t dominates the bene￿t of e⁄ort-cost reduction. Thus,
our results show that the choice of organizational structure may have an important
implications on market structure.
The above result, to some extent, also gives an interesting empirical interpre-
tation. We show that under A-organization it is likely that there is more com-
petition and less market concentration than under P-organization. Further, in an
A-organization, the manager is powerful and posesses formal control right over im-
portant decisions. The power confered to the manager typically arises from the fact
that the ￿rm has a dispersed ownership-structure in which no single shareholder can
dominate the ￿rm. On the contrary, when the ownership structure is concentrated
in the hand of a large shareholder, the formal control right is usually retained by the
controlling shareholder. We can thus use ownership concentration as a proxy for
the organizational structure. An organization with low ownership concentration re-
sembles more of an A-organization than a P-organization. Our result thus points to
a positive relationship between ownership concentration and market concentration;
higher ownership concetration implies higher market concentration.
4.3 Market-Structure Con￿guration 3: The Monopoly Case
Under this con￿guration, the assignment of real authority does not really matter
for the market structure. Firm 1 is always a monopolist irrespective of who has real
23authority. However, the assignment of formal authority determines the magnitude
of the agent￿ s and the principal￿ s expected payo⁄s.
The following proposition summarizes the impacts of a change in the exogenous
variables (cp and ￿) a⁄ecting ￿3 and the level of private bene￿ts b on the optimal
choice of organizational-structure. Notice that c and ￿ do not in￿ uence ￿3. As a
benchmark, we consider the case in which the principal is indi⁄erent between the
two organizational structures.
Proposition 7 Suppose that initially the principal is indi⁄erent between retaining
formal authority, i.e. choosing P-organization, and delegating formal authority, i.e.
choosing A-organization, and the relative marginal-costs con￿guration is given by
cp < ￿cp < ￿ < ￿.
(i) Holding b constant, the principal delegates (retains) formal authority if either
cp decreases (increases) and ￿ decreases (increases).
(ii) Holding ￿ constant, the principal delegates (retains) formal authority if the
agent￿ s private bene￿ts (b) increase (decrease).
It is interesting to note that the above results are in contrast to the results
of Marin and Verdier (2003). In their paper, an increase in the degree of prod-
uct market competition induces the principal to move from P-organization to A-
organization. Our paper shows that even in the absence of product-market compe-
tition the principal may choose A-organization instead of P-organization.
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the link between a ￿rm￿ s choice governing organizational struc-
ture of the decision-making process and product market competition. We con-
sider a ￿rm that consists of a principal and an agent. The ￿rm engages in a
Cournot duopoly competition. Two types of organizational structure are consid-
ered, namely P-organization in which formal authority is retained by the principal
and A-organization in which formal authority is delegated to the agent. The holder
of formal authority is entitled to decide which production process to implement.
If the principal is the holder, she prefers to choose the most economical produc-
tion process. If the agent is the holder he prefers to choose a production process
24that gives him private bene￿ts even though it may not necessarily be the most
economical one.
Apriori, the marginal cost implications of all the available production process
are unknown to both the principal and the agent. However, they can be learned
when costly information acquisition e⁄ort is exerted. The greater the exerted e⁄ort,
the higher the cost of e⁄ort will be, but also the higher is the probability of getting
informed. The presence of private bene￿ts motivates the agent to exert higher e⁄ort,
which is what the principal wants. Delegation of formal authority to the agent may
thus be actually bene￿cial for the principal in terms of e⁄ort elicitation, although
it may give the principal a lower operating pro￿t.
In the paper, we distinguish authority into formal and real authority. The former
is de￿ned as the authority that is legally assigned to the holder, while the latter is
de￿ned as the authority that is obtained due to the information superiority.
We show that there is a negative relationship between the toughness of product
market competition and the incentive of the principal to delegate formal authority to
the agent. Competition gets tougher for various reasons such as an increase in own
marginal cost, a decrease in its rival￿ s marginal cost, an increase in the ine¢ ciency
of the production process, and an increase in the degree of product substitution.
Our paper thus argues that a delegation of formal authority will be less likely to
occur when the product market competition intensi￿es.
We also have other interesting implications. Under some conditions, ￿rm 1
would prefer to choose an organizational structure that will accommodate its rival
and gives the ￿rm a lower operating pro￿t. Had the ￿rm chosen an alternative
organizational structure, its rival would have been driven out of the market. Es-
sentially, by sacri￿cing its operating pro￿t, the principal can motivate the agent
to exert higher e⁄ort and this allows the principal to economize on her e⁄ort cost.
The reduction in operating pro￿t is dominated by the bene￿t of e⁄ort-cost reduc-
tion. On the contrary, under some other conditions, ￿rm 1 may instead prefer to
choose an organizational structure that will drive its rival out of the market. This
happens when the reduction in operating pro￿t dominates the bene￿t of e⁄ort-cost
reduction. To conclude, we show that the choice of organizational structure may
shape the prevailing market structure.
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26Let us de￿ne b ￿ = 1
2(c + 2 ￿ ￿), and suppose that
￿ = b ￿ ￿ " =
1
2
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with either " < 0 or " ￿ 0. We know that the monopoly pro￿t is larger than the
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Substituting ￿ into the above expression and simplifying the resulting expression
we obtain,




We know that in order to have market-structure con￿guration 2, we require cp <
[2c ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)] < ￿cp < 1
2 [c + (2 ￿ ￿)]. We also know that 0 ￿ cp < 1. Consequently,
we should have, 2c￿(2 ￿ ￿) > 0. Next, since 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, we have ￿(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ (2 ￿ ￿),
which implies that,
2c ￿ ￿(2 ￿ ￿) > 0:
Suppose that we have " ￿ 0, then,









which is a contradiction. Thus, in order to satisfy Assumption 2, we should have
" < 0 where " is su¢ ciently high, and hence
￿ = b ￿ ￿ " |{z}
<0
and ￿ > b ￿.
Accordingly, since ￿ > b ￿ we thus have
@￿2
@cp < 0. This completes the proof.
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Thus, we proof that
@￿2
@￿ < 0.
Finally, evaluating the derivatives ￿3 with respect to cp and ￿ yields,
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It can be straightforwardly veri￿ed that we have
@￿3
@cp ￿ 0 and
@￿3
@￿ < 0. Thus, we
complete our proof of Proposition 1.￿
Proof of Lemma 5 Point 1 can be veri￿ed easily by substituting ￿1p = 0 and
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28Recall that we impose 0 ￿ ￿1p ￿ 1, 0 ￿ ￿b ￿ 1, and 0 ￿ b ￿ 1, hence it can be
veri￿ed that the above derivative has a positive sign as stated in Point 2. It is also

















with respect to ￿1i and sim-

































= 0 if ￿1p = ￿1p =
3￿b￿1
2￿b . However, since 0 ￿ ￿1p ￿ 1 we know that when 1=3 ￿ ￿b ￿ 1 then ￿1p ￿ 0,
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Proof of Lemma 6 Point 1 can be veri￿ed easily by substituting ￿1p = 0 and
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Since we have 0 ￿ ￿1p ￿ 1, 0 ￿ ￿b ￿ 1, and 0 ￿ b ￿ 1; therefore the above
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2 ￿ 0:
Given that 0 ￿ b ￿ 1, the sign of the above derivative is positive.￿
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof consists of three parts.
First, we begin with the case of 0 ￿ ￿b ￿ 1=3. We know from Lemma 5 (Points




is increasing at an increasing rate in ￿1p. We also know




is also increasing at an increasing









￿1p=0 = 0:Thus, both functions start at
the same origin. Both functions will have another intersection, other than ￿1p = 0,












, and given that the permissible value of
￿b is [0;1] we can establish that b ￿1p > 1. Accordingly, for the admissible value of








only intersect at ￿1p = 0.



















￿1p=1 = ￿b+(1 ￿ b)
2 =2. Thus, we have ￿b+(1 ￿ b)
2 =2 > 1=2
if b > 2 ￿ 2￿, and ￿b + (1 ￿ b)
2 =2 > 1=2 if b < 2 ￿ 2￿. Thus, we can conclude


















if b < 2￿2￿. Thus, we partly con￿rm Proposition 3.
Third, we now evaluate the case of 1=3 < ￿b ￿ 1. From the ￿rst part of








will only have one intersection at ￿1p = 0. Also we know that
￿1p = 3￿b￿1




. Let us denote this in￿ ection




is increasing at a decreasing rate




is increasing at an increasing rate in ￿1p and there is no other

















. Similarly, it is straightforward to see that








. To conclude, whenever









. Thus, we complete the proof.￿
Proof of Proposition 3 Let us denote the probability that production-process
a is chosen in A-organization by Pr(ajA-org) and the probability that production
process a is chosen in P-organization by Pr(ajP-org). Using (17), (21), (18), and
(22) we can express,
Pr(ajA-org) = e















Since 0 ￿ ￿1p ￿ 1, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and 0 ￿ b ￿ 1, we thus have Pr(ajA-org) ￿
Pr(ajP-org).
Next, we denote the probability that production-process p is chosen in A-
organization by Pr(pjA-org) and the probability that production process p is cho-
30sen in P-organization by Pr(pjP-org). We can then write,
Pr(pjA-org) = (1 ￿ e
￿￿)E
￿￿













We will show that Pr(pjA-org) ￿ Pr(pjP-org). Suppose, on the contrary, we have
Pr(pjA-org) < Pr(pjP-org). This implies that
(1￿￿b)















￿ 1. Hence, we have a contradiction. Consequently, we have
indeed Pr(pjA-org) > Pr(pjP-org).￿
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